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Abstract
This paper examines theoretically whether by combining both output based
refunding and abatement expenditures based refunding it is possible to limit the
negative consequences that a pollution tax imply for a polluting industry. We
show that this is indeed the case by using a three-part policy where emissions are
subject to a fee and where output and abatement expenditures are subsidized.
When the industry is homogenous, it is possible to replicate the standard emission
tax outcome by inducing a polluting firm to choose the production and emission
levels obtained under any emission tax, without departing from budget balance.
By construction, any polluter earns strictly more than under the standard tax
alone without rebate, making this proposal more acceptable to the industry.
When firms are heterogenous, the refunding policy needed to replicate the
standard emission tax outcome is personalized in the sense that at least the
output subsidy should be type dependent and it is strictly prefered only from
the industry’s point of view to a standard environmental tax. We also explore the
implications of uniform three-part refunding policies for a heterogenous industry.
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1 Introduction
Taxing sources of emissions is often difficult to implement in practice despite its theoret-
ical appeal, since Pigou, to solve pollution problems in a cost-effective way. Traditional
arguments against emission taxes encompass that they may harm industry’s compet-
itiveness, they may hit low income households hard and last but not least reducing
domestic emissions may have zero effect on global pollution as increased foreign emis-
sions may follow. As a consequence, it is not surprising that emissions taxes tends to
be usually low and this typically undermines the efficiency of environmental policies
(OECD, 2015).
It has long been recognized that earmarking the product of taxes to polluters is a
way to diminish the economic burden to them and hence to potentially lessen political
opposition to emissions taxes.1 In particular, Aidt (2010) and Fredriksson and Sterner
(2005) show that refunding increases the political feasibility of environmental taxation
and that firms cleaner than average may even favor higher pollution taxes because they
potentially benefit from the redistribution operated by the output based refunding
policy. Refunding revenues to polluters in proportion to output is the way policy
makers in Sweden have chosen with respect to the taxes collected on NOx emissions that
cause ultimately acid rains (Sterner and Ho¨glund-Isaksson, 2006).2 Many authors have
studied the properties of this refunding scheme with respect to the incentives to produce
1Although a breach in the principle of budgetary universality and even if the relative advantage in
terms of political acceptability is difficult to measure, earmarking taxes is a popular strategy in many
countries to secure funds towards e.g. governmental agencies or for specific purposes. In a country
like France, it can represent 27% of total taxes collected by the government (Conseil des Pre´le`vements
Obligatoires, 2018).
2There are other examples of refunding emission taxes through other channels. For instance, there
is the tax on pesticides introduced in Denmark in 1996. There, two main channels were used to refund
tax payments to farmers: first, there was a reduction on a tax on the value of land and second, to
ensure that no specific sector of agriculture pays much more in tax revenue than the benefit it receives
in terms of reduced land taxes, a compensation is decided on a yearly basis and transferred into
specific funds which use is determined by farmers’ organizations (e.g. to support marketing initiatives
and research). Also the French water agencies system relies on emission fees paid by polluters that
are refunded back to co-finance abatement expenditures (e.g. by installing some epuration systems).
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and to abate pollution, compared to optimal policy (Fischer, 2001). While Sterner and
Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) study a perfectly competitive market structure, Gersbach and
Requate (2004) concentrate on imperfectly competitive markets. Cato (2010) suggests
that, when taking into consideration the endogeneity of market structure, there is
a need to introduce an entry tax or license to avoid too much entry caused by the
refunding policy. More recently, Bonilla et al. (2015) and Coria and Mohlin (2017)
have shown how output based refunding of emission taxes can spur the adoption of new
technologies when firms are not able to strategically influence the size of the refund.
Sterner and Turnheim (2009) have studied the Swedish refunded fee on NOx and
concluded that the high tax allowed by the refunding did have significant impacts on
innovation and on the observed decrease in NOx emission intensities. In Norway, the
emissions payments for NOx are refunded in proportion to (observable) abatement ex-
penditures. In a recent paper, Hagem et al. (2015) compare both output based and
abatement based schemes and show that refunding necessarily implies a distortion on
abatement (and production) decisions at the individual level compared to the situa-
tion where only emissions are taxed (at the same rate). More precisely, both output
based and abatement expenditures based refunding induce a cost-ineffective provision
of abatement as polluters put relatively too much effort into reducing emissions via
abatement compared with reducing output. It follows that both schemes are welfare
inferior to the optimal standard tax on emissions, because they lead to inferior output
reductions.
This paper examines theoretically whether by combining both output based re-
funding and abatement expenditures based refunding it is possible to reduce these
distortions. We actually show that this is indeed the case by using such a three-part
policy where emissions are subject to a fee and where output and abatement expendi-
tures are subject to a tax/subsidy. In particular, when the industry is homogenous, it
is possible to replicate the standard emission tax outcome using such a policy: with the
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appropriate definition of the fee and of the output and abatement subsidies, the three-
part refunding policy induces the polluting firm to choose the production and emission
levels obtained under any emission tax. This is done without departing from budget
balance which entails that (at least) a portion of taxes collected is returned back to pol-
luters. By construction, the proposed regulation scheme entails that the polluter earns
strictly more than under the standard tax alone without refunding, thereby making
this proposal more acceptable by the industry.
More precisely, the design of the three-part policy follows simple rules. First, the
emission fee necessarily differs from the standard emission tax, otherwise the only
policy that gives the proper incentives with respect to production and pollution is
the benchmark standard tax regulation without refunding. Second, if emissions are
overtaxed compared to the standard emission tax situation, then to restore the proper
incentives to produce and to pollute, it is necessary to tax abatement and to subsidize
output. Conversely, for similar reasons, if emissions are undertaxed it is necessary to
subsidize abatement and to tax production. Whether one or the other policy is adapted
to a particular context actually depends on whether the budget constraint can hold.
We show that this depends on the (local) properties of the abatement technology: if
production strongly determines abatement expenditures, then the three-part refunding
policy entails overtaxation of emissions while it is the reverse when either pollution
mainly determines or production weakly determines abatement costs.3
When the industry is heterogenous, the refunding policy needed to replicate the
standard emission tax outcome is now personalized in the sense that at least the output
subsidy should be type dependent. Another result is that this three-part policy is
strictly preferred only from the industry’s point of view to a standard environmental
3More precisely, abatement expenditures are assumed to be increasing in production and decreasing
in emissions. When abatement expenditures are raised by more than 1% when both production
and pollution increase by 1%, we consider that production strongly determines abatement costs.
Conversely, when abatement costs either decrease or is raised by less than 1%, we consider respectively
that pollution mainly determines or that production only weakly determines abatement costs.
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tax.
We then explore the implications of uniform three-part refunding policies in this
context and find, by using an example, that it is possible for the refunding policy to
replicate the standard tax outcome in the aggregate at the sector’s level with respect to
production and emissions without departing from the budget constraint. Abatement
expenditures differ in general from those spent under a standard emission tax without
refunding.
The policy implications of the analysis are clear. Because refunding emission taxes
can help to ensure the political acceptability of strong environmental regulations (as in
the Swedish NOx example), and because output based or abatement based refunding
each generates some adverse incentives impacts, it could be interesting to go beyond by
combining both refunding schemes. Under some conditions and a little more complexity
for the regulation scheme (three instruments instead of two), a three-part policy allows
to get rid of adverse incentives effects from the usual refunding channels and yet ensures
that an exogenous refunding rate towards the polluting industry is met.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out assumptions and notations
as well as the two benchmarks of a standard emission tax and of output based versus
abatement expenditures based refunding policies. In section 3, we consider the three-
part refunding policy in a context with homogenous firms. Section 4 explores the case
of heterogenous firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions and notations
Consider a competitive industry whose size is fixed to n firms indexed by i = 1...n.
Product is homogenous and sold at (constant) price p. Production is also polluting
and any firm has the possibility to control and reduce it by employing its optimal mix
5
of output reduction and specific input use for abatement. We decompose the total cost
of firm i as the sum of first a production cost ci(qi), twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing in production qi and second an abatement cost function ai(qi, ei),
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in qi, strictly decreasing in emis-
sions ei up to some level e
◦
i (qi) and then increasing. Under laissez-faire, i.e. in the
absence of pollution regulation, firm i would pollute up to the ”selfish” level e
◦
i (qi) that
minimizes abatement costs.
We also assume that total cost ci(.) + ai(., .) is strictly quasi-convex, which ensures
that the profit function pii(qi, ei) is strictly quasi-concave. Denoting aix and aixy the
corresponding first-order partial derivative and the second-order partial derivative re-
spectively for x, y ∈ {e, q}, strict quasi-convexity of total cost means that aiee > 0,
c′′i + aiqq > 0 and aieec
′′
i + aieeaiqq − a2iqe > 0.
We will also make use of the two following assumptions that would prove useful in
obtaining some comparative statics results.
Assumption 1 The abatement cost function ai(., .) is such that aieq < 0.
Assumption 1 says that the marginal benefit of pollution for the firm, namely
−aie > 0, is increasing in qi. The more the firm produces the higher the cost savings
from polluting are.
Assumption 2 The abatement cost function ai(., .) is such that the ratio
aie
aiq
is in-
creasing in qi and in ei.
It can be checked that assumption 2 holds whenever |aieq| is sufficiently small and
ai convex in q.
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4Indeed, dropping the index i for clarity, we note that ∂∂q (
ae
aq
) =
aqaqe−aeaqq
a2q
and ∂∂e (
ae
aq
) =
aqaee−aeaqe
a2q
. Hence, it is sufficient that |aqe| is sufficiently close to 0 for assumption 2 to hold.
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2.2 Standard emission tax as a benchmark
Let us first define the benchmark situation of a standard emission tax t without re-
funding (or when refunding corresponds to a lump sum transfer). When facing the
emission tax t, firm i maximizes its (strictly quasi-concave) profit function with re-
spect to production and emissions:
max
qi,ei
pii = pqi − ci(qi)− ai(qi, ei)− tei
and this leads to the following necessary and sufficient optimality conditions (assuming
interior solutions):
p = c′i(q
∗
i ) + aiq(q
∗
i , e
∗
i )
−aie(q∗i , e∗i ) = t. (1)
Firm i’s optimal reaction to the emission tax t is governed by marginal cost pricing and
equality between marginal abatement cost and marginal pollution price. For further
reference, aggregate production is denoted Q∗(t) =
∑
i q
∗
i (t) and aggregate pollution
is E∗(t) =
∑
i e
∗
i (t). Furthermore, aggregate abatement expenditures are denoted
A∗(t) =
∑
i ai(q
∗
i (t), e
∗
i (t)).
In terms of net profit, the regulated firm earns:
pi∗i = pq
∗
i − ci(q∗i )− ai(q∗i , e∗i )− te∗i
which is assumed positive for any i and for the values of t considered.
In Appendix A, we show that comparative statics results with respect to price,
emission tax and increase in abatement costs scale can be established as follows. First,
quasi-concavity of profit implies that production is increasing in output price p whereas
emissions are decreasing in the tax level t. Second, assumption 1 ensures that piiqe > 0
or equivalently that the marginal profitability of qi increases in emissions ei. This
in turn implies that production is decreasing in the tax level t while emissions are
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increasing in output price. Third, under assumption 2, an increase in the scale of
abatement cost ai(qi, ei) leads to decreasing production and increasing emissions.
2.3 Output based versus abatement expenditures based re-
funding policies
Now consider the possibility for the government to refund emission payments collected
back to the firms. We here revisit results obtained by Hagem et al. in a competitive
setting with our notations (see also Gersbach and Requate (2004) for an analysis in
markets with imperfect competition).
For a given emission tax t, it is interesting to compare a policy that entails refunding
through a subsidy τ on output and an alternative policy refunding occurs through a
subsidy s on abatement cost to a policy with no refunding of the fee. Whenever there
is a subsidy, and whether it is output or abatement based, its level is given by the
budget constraint that writes:
tE = τQ
in the output based refunding case and
tE = sA
in the abatement expenditures refunding case. The total emissions tax collected are
returned back to polluters either proportionally to output or to abatement cost.
Given the above comparative statics results presented above, it is easy to recover
the following results due to Hagem et al. (2015).
Proposition 1 (Hagem et al.) Under assumptions 1 and 2, (i) for a given emission
tax t and compared to a policy without refunding, an output based refunding policy (τ , t)
implies too much pollution and an abatement expenditures based refunding policy (s, t)
implies too few pollution, and (ii) for a given pollution target, the emission tax needed
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under output based refunding policy is larger than the tax without refunding whereas
the tax needed under abatement expenditures based refunding policy is lower.
Proof: Part (i) directly follows from Appendix A which states that, for a fixed
price of pollution, subsidizing the abatement cost decreases pollution while subsidizing
production will increase emissions. Similarly, part (ii) holds because Appendix A states
that, in order to keep pollution constant, it is necessary to increase the pollution fee if
one is going to subsidize production, while it is necessary to decrease the pollution fee
if abatement expenditures are to be subsidized.
A two-part refunding policy generally involves a distortion on the pollution level
for any firm and thus in aggregate, compared to what prevails under an emission tax
without refunding. Intuitively, an output subsidy increases the marginal benefit of
production which in turn increases the marginal incentives to pollute. Conversely, an
abatement subsidy decreases the marginal benefit of pollution which in turn induces a
downward distortion on pollution.
The opposite nature of the distortions brought by the two ways to refund emission
taxes leads to study whether by combining both subsidies it is possible to reduce these
distortions. We will first examine this possibility for a homogenous industry in the
next section while the study of heterogenous industries is postponed to section 4.
3 Three-part refunding policies for a homogenous
industry
3.1 Analysis
When the industry is composed of identical firms, the equilibrium outcome under a
standard emission tax t is described by the system (1) that reduces to:
p = c′(q∗) + a∗q
−a∗e = t (2)
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where we denote, for the sake of exposition, a∗ ≡ a(q∗, e∗), a∗q ≡ aq(q∗, e∗) and a∗e ≡
ae(q
∗, e∗).
The question we ask is whether it is possible to replicate this equilibrium outcome
for a given tax t by using instead a three-part policy based on a per unit fee f on
emissions, an output subsidy τ per unit and an abatement subsidy at rate s, without
departing from budget balance. The natural advantage of the three-part policy would
then be to leave a higher profit to firms and thus to make the regulation more acceptable
to them. It turns out that the answer to this question is positive as we now show. We
proceed by first defining the budget constraint of the government and then the optimal
reaction of a representative polluter to a three-part refunding policy, before establishing
our main result in this section.
We depart from Hagem et al. (2015) by assuming that there is also a revenue
requirement R asked by the government from the regulation policy.5 To avoid an
arbitrary choice of R, we assume that
R = (1− δ)tE∗
with δ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the government requires the refunding policy to collect at least
a portion 1− δ of the emissions taxes tE∗(t) that would be collected in the absence of
refunding. When δ = 1 there is complete refunding of emissions taxes towards polluters
while for δ = 0, the revenue requirement will actually impose the absence of refunding
(τ = s = 0) as it will be clear below. When 0 < δ < 1 , there is only partial refunding of
taxes to polluters and parameter δ represents the rate of refunding. This representation
of the budget constraint allows for a richer modelling of possible refunding policies that
can be only partial with a portion of taxes being spent purposedly elsewhere in the
economy.
5Gersbach and Requate (2004) and Cato (2010) also consider the possibility of partial refunding.
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To sum up, the budget constraint of the regulation schedule writes as:
fE = τQ+ sA+R (3)
where industry’s emissions are E, total production is Q and total abatement expendi-
tures A. Hence, all emissions taxes collected net of the revenue requirement R are given
back to polluters under the form of output and abatement subsidies and this implicitly
defines a relationship between emission tax, production and abatement subsidies.
Facing a three-part policy (τ , s, f), the optimal decisions for a representative firm
are
(qˆ(τ , s, f), eˆ(τ , s, f)) ∈ arg max
q,e
pi(q, e) ≡ (p+ τ)q − c(q)− (1− s)a(q, e)− fe (4)
and the corresponding profit is
pˆi(τ , s, f) = pi(qˆ(τ , s, f), eˆ(τ , s, f)
Let us denote
aˆ ≡ a(qˆ, eˆ) with aˆq = ∂a
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=qˆ, e=eˆ
and aˆe =
∂a
∂e
∣∣∣∣
q=qˆ, e=eˆ
The FOCs are (for interior solutions):
p+ τ = c′(qˆ) + (1− s)aˆq
−(1− s)aˆe = f (5)
and second order conditions are (assuming s < 1):
∂2pi
∂q2
∣∣∣∣
q=qˆ, e=eˆ
= −c′′(qˆ)− (1− s)aˆqq < 0
∂2pi
∂e2
∣∣∣∣
q=qˆ, e=eˆ
= −(1− s)aˆee < 0
∂2pi
∂q2
∂2pi
∂e2
−
(
∂2pi
∂q∂e
)2∣∣∣∣∣
q=qˆ, e=eˆ
= (1− s) [aˆeec′′(qˆ) + (1− s)(aˆqqaˆee − aˆ2qe)] > 0
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Let us denote
σ∗ = 1− ε∗a,e − ε∗a,q
where ε∗a,e = a
∗
ee
∗/a∗ < 0 is the elasticity of a w.r.t. e taken at the standard emission
tax optimum q∗, e∗ while ε∗a,q = a
∗
qq
∗/a∗ > 0 denotes the elasticity of a w.r.t. q and
taken at the optimum q∗, e∗. The sum of elasticities ε∗a,e + ε
∗
a,q represents the rela-
tive change of abatement expenditures when both production and pollution are raised
by 1%.6 It can be positive or negative as abatement expenditures are increasing in
production but are decreasing in emissions. The value σ∗ measures how much this
sum of elasticities compares with 1. Hence, if σ∗ < 0, this means that abatement
expenditures raise by more than 1% when both production and emissions are raised by
1%. We describe such a situation as one where production strongly determines abate-
ment expenditures. Conversely, when σ∗ > 0, abatement expenditures either decrease
or are raised by less than 1%, when both production and emissions increase by 1%.
This means that respectively either pollution mainly determines or production weakly
determines abatement expenditures.7
Overall, the sign of σ∗ represents a local property (i.e. at the optimum q∗, e∗)
of the abatement technology, depending on how production and pollution interact in
expenditures directed towards pollution reduction.
Using the above definition of σ∗ and comparing (2) and (5), we can establish the
following result.
Proposition 2 For a homogeneous industry of fixed size and for σ∗ < 0 or σ∗ > δ te
∗
a∗ ,
there exists a unique three-part policy that entails any firm to choose eˆ = e∗ and qˆ = q∗
6Indeed, from a ≡ a(q, e) we obtain by differentiating da = aqdq + aede. Dividing by a both
members of the equality and introducing elasticies, we get d ln a = εa,qd ln q + εa,ed ln e. Assuming
that both q and e change by the same percentage, i.e. d ln q = d ln e, then d ln a = (εa,q + εa,e)d ln e.
7When σ∗ = 0, then production and pollution are both determinants with equal strengh for
abatement expenditures. As will be clear below, this limit case prevents the budget constraint from
being met and should thus be excluded when looking for a three-part refunding policy.
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while sustaining the budget constraint. It is characterized by
f = (1− s)t
τ = −sa∗q
s =
δte∗
σ∗a∗
Moreover, any firm earns pˆi(τ , s, f) = pi∗ + δte∗ so that the three-part policy is strictly
preferred by all firms to a standard emission tax as long as the refunding rate δ is
strictly positive.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The intuition is clear: with the three instruments contained in the three-part policy,
one can mimic the standard emission tax outcome in terms of production and pollution
without sacrificing the budget balance. Moreover, due to the (at least partial) refunding
of taxes, the three-part policy (τ , s, f) is strictly preferred to the standard emission tax
by all firms. When the government requires no refunding at all (δ = 0), the three-part
policy boils down to the no-refunding policy with s = τ = 0 and f = t.
To interpret the policy exhibited, note first that τ and s necessarily have opposite
signs (as aq > 0). Second, f is necessarily different from t, otherwise we are back to the
no-refunding policy: indeed, if f = t this would set 1− s = 1 that is a zero abatement
subsidy which then implies a zero subsidy on output (τ = 0).Hence, it follows that, with
a three-part refunding policy, emissions are either overtaxed or undertaxed, compared
to the benchmark emission tax t.
If emissions are overtaxed, then the definition of f implies that abatement should
be taxed (s < 0). Intuitively, overtaxing emissions induces the firm to potentially
overinvest in abatement effort and hence a tax on abatement is needed to reduce these
incentives. Also, output should be subsidized (τ > 0) in order to counterbalance the
marginal disincentives to produce because abatement expenditures are taxed.
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Conversely, when emissions are undertaxed compared to t, then there is potentially
underinvestment in abatement effort and a subsidy is introduced to stimulate abate-
ment, along with a tax on output intended to counterbalance the increased marginal
incentives to produce caused by the abatement subsidy.
Ultimately, whether the refunding policy is of the first or the second type depends
on whether it is possible for the budget constraint to hold with one or the other policy.
This in turn depends on the sign of σ∗ as the budget constraint implies that necessarily
s and σ∗ should have the same sign. Indeed, by rewriting equation (18) and using the
definition of R, we obtain:
(t− f)e∗ + τq∗ + sa∗ = δte∗.
It follows that the amount δte∗ = pˆi − pi∗ > 0, which is the money given back to the
polluter thanks to the refunding policy, is spread into some abatement and output
subsidies plus the difference between the standard tax and the emission fee payments.
As shown in Appendix B, by using the definition of f and τ given in Proposition 2, we
get that (t − f)e∗ + τq∗ + sa∗ can be written as being proportional to the abatement
subsidy payment sa∗, the factor of proportionality being precisely σ∗. In total, we get
as indicated in Proposition 2:
σ∗sa∗ = δte∗. (6)
Note that for (6) to hold, we need to exclude the case where σ∗ = 0. Also, in
Appendix B, we show that to preserve the quasi-concavity of profit, we exclude that s >
1 or equivalently that σ∗ < δ te
∗
a∗ whenever it is positive. We deduce from Proposition
2 the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 For δ ∈ (0, 1) and t given, the three-part policy is characterized as follows:
(i) if σ∗ is positive and greater than δ te
∗
a∗ , then there is under-taxation of emissions
(f < t), a subsidy on abatement (s > 0) and a tax on production (τ < 0)
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(ii) if σ∗ is negative, then there is over-taxation of emissions (f > t), a tax on abate-
ment (s < 0) and a subsidy on production (τ > 0).
3.2 Examples
Corollary 1 indicates that the refunding policy can take two different forms depending
on the sign of σ∗ which depends itself on the characteristics of the abatement tech-
nology. While the refunding policy in the case where σ∗ is positive seems appealing,
the policy when σ∗ is negative seems unattractive at first sight because one has to tax
abatement and to subsidize output. Nevertheless, both forms of the policy reach the
same goal: the standard tax outcome is obtained in terms of production, emissions
and abatement expenditures together with some money given back to polluters, whose
size depends on the refunding rate δ chosen by the government and on the benchmark
tax level t. To illustrate, we consider in this section two different specifications of the
model.
3.2.1 A quadratic specification
Let us assume that all firms share the following cost and abatement functions, c(q) =
cq2/2 and a(q, e) = k(q − e/γ)2/2. The interpretation is that if x denotes the abate-
ment effort then the emission level is proportional to production minus the abatement
effort, i.e. e = γ(q − x) and the abatement effort entails a quadratic cost kx2/2.
Straightforward computations lead to:
q∗ =
p− tγ
c
> 0 if t < p/γ
e∗ =
pγ
c
− tγ2
(
k + c
kc
)
> 0 if t <
k
k + c
p
γ
e∗/q∗ = γ
p− (k+c
k
)
tγ
p− tγ
Note that the production level is strictly decreasing in γ. Moreover, both the emission
level e∗ and the emission intensity ratio e∗/q∗ are first increasing and then decreasing
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in γ (or equivalently in q). Hence, this formulation generates a hump shaped emission
curve as positive parameter γ decreases and consequently when production grows.
Emissions are low when the size of firms in terms of their production is small or large
while they are higher for firms with intermediary sizes. The same is true for the emission
intensity ratio. This feature of the specification is consistent with at least the fact that
the lower pollution intensity of large firms is an observation widely documented in the
empirical literature (see e.g. Andreoni and Levinson, 1998, or Wang and Wheeler,
2005).
The maximum of pollution is in 1/γ = 2t(k+c)/(pk). Abatement effort q∗−e∗/γ =
tγ/k is increasing in γ as long as e∗ > 0. We thus assume that the condition t < k
k+c
p
γ
holds so that pollution remains strictly positive. We also find that σ∗ = −1, i.e. a
negative constant, and this implies that emissions are overtaxed in the refunding policy.
Applying straightforwardly Proposition 2, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume that all firms share the following cost and abatement func-
tions, c(q) = cq2/2 and a(q, e) = k(q − e/γ)2/2. Then the unique three-part policy is
such that:
s =
2δ
c
(
k + c− k p
tγ
)
< 0
τ = 2δγ
k + c
c
(
k
k + c
p
γ
− t
)
> 0
f = t(1− 2δk + c
c
) + 2δ
p
γ
> t
where one has to overtax emissions, to tax abatement and to refund taxes through a
production subsidy.
Recall that small firms (in terms of their production level) are characterized by
high values of γ. The refunding policy is such that the tax on abatement in absolute
value |s| is decreasing in γ as well as the emission fee f and the output subsidy τ .
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Hence, when the industry is composed of small firms, the refunding policy entails an
emission fee closer to the standard tax t and lower output subsidy and abatement tax
in absolute value, compared to an industry with larger firms ceteris paribus.
3.2.2 A Cobb-Douglas based specification
Let us still assume that c(q) is still quadratic, c(q) ≡ cq2/2, but that now the abatement
technology associates emissions and a specific input l with unit price to final production
according to a Cobb-Douglas form (q = lβeα), so that the abatement cost function
writes:
a(q, e) = q1/βe−α/β
with α, β > 0. Note that this function is increasing in q, convex in q if and only if
β < 1 and decreasing convex in e.8 Also, assumption 1 holds as aqe < 0. The abatement
function is also quasi convex if and only if α + β < 1, i.e. when there are decreasing
returns to scale for the underlying Cobb-Douglas production function.
The two elasticities ε∗a,e and ε
∗
a,q (and so σ
∗) do not actually depend on t and are
constants given by:
ε∗a,e =
a∗ee
∗
a∗
= −α
β
ε∗a,q =
a∗qq
∗
a∗
=
1
β
and we obtain
σ∗ = 1− ε∗a,e − ε∗a,q =
α + β − 1
β
.
The abatement subsidy is also a constant equal to:
s = −δε
∗
a,e
σ∗
=
δα
α + β − 1 .
To avoid the possibility of having s > 1, we assume that δ < max(1, (α + β − 1)/α).
Note also that the case of constant returns to scale (α+β = 1) is excluded as this leads
8We assume that emissions can be at most equal to some exogenous level e¯ > 0 which represents
the selfish level that would occur in the absence of emission taxation (”laissez faire” policy).
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to σ∗ = 0 which makes it impossible to satisfy the budget constraint with a three-part
refunding policy.
We sum up our main result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that all firms share the following cost and abatement func-
tions, c(q) = cq2/2 and a(q, e) = q1/βe−α/β with α, β > 0. Then, the unique three-part
policy entails an abatement subsidy rate given by
s =
δα
α + β − 1
and s < (>)0 if and only if there are decreasing (increasing) returns to scale in the
abatement technology (α + β < (>)1).
To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts the refunding policy for the case of IRS (panel (a))
and DRS (panel (b)) as a function of the benchmark tax t, and for specific values of the
parameters chosen so that the total cost c(q) + a(q, e) is quasi convex in (q, e), which
ensures quasi concavity of the profit function.9
4 Extension to heterogenous industries
4.1 Personalized three-part refunding policies
In this section, we examine the case of heterogenous industries with respect to cost
conditions. The three-part policy able to replicate the standard emission tax outcome
while sustaining the budget constraint is a priori personalized and should thus be
indexed by i : fi, τ i and si. Faced with this three-part policy, firm i chooses qˆi(τ i, si, fi)
and eˆi(τ i, si, fi) such that:
p+ τ i = c
′
i(qˆi) + (1− si)aˆiq
−(1− si)aˆie = fi (7)
9We use p = 20, c = 20, and a refunding rate of δ = 50%. For the case of IRS, we set α = 1.5 and
β = 2. For the case of DRS, we set α = 0.5 and β = 0.3. We also normalize the mass of firms to 1.
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(a): Increasing returns to scale, s > 0, f < t and τ < 0.
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(b): Decreasing returns to scale, s < 0, f > t and τ > 0.
Figure 1: Three-part refunding policies for the Cobb-Douglas based specification.
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As above, comparing (1) with (7) allows to derive the following result.
Proposition 5 For a heterogenous industry of fixed size, there exists at least a three-
part policy that entails any firm i to choose eˆi = e
∗
i and qˆi = q
∗
i while sustaining the
budget constraint (provided firm’s problem concavity is preserved). They are character-
ized by:
fi = (1− si)t
τ i = −sia∗iq∑
i
σ∗i a
∗
i si = δtE
∗
where
σ∗i = 1− ε∗ai,e − ε∗ai,q.
Moreover, aggregate net profit is larger than the one without rebate (Πˆ−Π∗ = δtE∗ > 0)
so that the three-part policy is strictly preferred from the industry’s point of view to a
standard environmental tax.
Proof: See Appendix C.
One particular policy of interest is where one takes si = s ≡ tE∗/
∑
i σ
∗
i a
∗
i and
fi = f = (1 − s)t for any i and where τ i = −sa∗iq. For this policy, the sign of∑
i σ
∗
i a
∗
i , weighted sum of abatement expenditures, is the key element. Assume that∑
i σ
∗
i a
∗
i > 0. In that case, the policy prescribes a uniform subsidy s > 0 on abatement,
a uniform tax on emissions that under-taxes emissions (f < t) and a personalized tax
τ i < 0 on production. Conversely, if
∑
i σ
∗
i a
∗
i < 0, then the policy prescribes a tax
on abatement (s < 0), a tax on emissions that over-taxes emissions (f > t) and a
personalized subsidy on production τ i > 0.
Two remarks are to be made. First, at the individual level, refunding is profitable if
only if sσ∗i > 0, that is when s and σ
∗
i have the same sign. While it is always profitable
for the industry as a whole, it may not be profitable for all members of the industry.
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Second, incomplete information will in general impede the implementation of such
personalized output subsidies. However, suppose that asymmetric information occurs
with respect to some abatement function parameter, then as production, pollution
and abatement expenditures are assumed observable, asymmetric information poses no
problem as the regulator can always deter any non truth-telling strategy by observing
all these variables. But if abatement expenditures can be manipulated by the firm
then truth telling must be induced by an appropriate choice of revelation mechanisms.
While the search for incentive compatible refunding policies is beyond the scope of this
paper, we instead investigate what can be done with a uniform policy (τ , s, f). This is
the purpose of the next section.
4.2 Uniform three-part refunding policies
We now consider a uniform policy of the type (τ , s, f) implemented in a sector composed
of n heterogenous polluting firms as described in section 4. Non-personalized policies
will not make it possible to have firms choosing q∗i and e
∗
i in general. Nevertheless, it is
still possible to find a three-part refunding policy that satisfies the budget constraint
and that leads to the same aggregate pollution and production levels that prevail under
any emission tax t without refunding. For this, a solution (τ , s, f) to the following
system for given t must exist:
Eˆ(τ , s, f)− E∗(t) = 0 (8)
Qˆ(τ , s, f)−Q∗(t) = 0 (9)
fEˆ(τ , s, f)− τQˆ(τ , s, f)− sAˆ(τ , s, f)− (1− δ)tE∗(t) = 0 (10)
Existence of a solution can be deduced from using the Implicit Function Theorem
and so by checking that the Jacobian matrix of the system is non singular. However,
studying the properties of this system of equations with this level of generality is not
very informative. Hence, we instead prove below that such a solution exists for a
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particular example relying on the specification used in section 3.2.1.
More importantly, a uniform three-part refunding policy solution of the system
above is unable in general to always ensure that the industry benefits from the refund,
because the uniform policy makes it impossible to have firms choosing individually q∗i
and e∗i . As a consequence, the aggregate costs of production and abatement under the
three-part refunding policy and under the standard tax policy generally differ. To see
this, recall that the aggregate profit of the industry under the three-part refunding
policy can be written as follows:
Πˆ = (p+ τ)Qˆ− Cˆ − (1− s)Aˆ− fEˆ
where Cˆ =
∑
i ci(qˆi), Aˆ =
∑
i ai(qˆi, eˆi) with qˆi(τ , s, f) and eˆi(τ , s, f) being the optimal
decisions for polluter i facing the policy (τ , s, f). Recall also that the aggregate profit
under the standard emission tax t is:
Π∗ = pQ∗ − C∗ − A∗ − tE∗
where C∗ =
∑
i ci(q
∗
i ). Computing the difference and using (8), (9), (10) and simplify-
ing, we obtain finally:
Πˆ− Π∗ = δtE∗ + C∗ + A∗ − Cˆ − Aˆ
It follows that Πˆ − Π∗ > 0 only if the uniform refunding policy does not increase
too much the aggregate cost of production (gross of emissions payments) compared
to the benchmark case of a standard emission tax t. Although the refunding policy
ensures stability of aggregate production and emission by definition, it will reallocate
these quantities among the different polluters compared to the benchmark case. If
this reallocation of production and emissions ends up by increasing too much the sum
of production and abatement costs for the industry, the refunding policy may not be
beneficial to the firms as a whole.
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To illustrate these results, we now specify the model and assume that there are n
firms indexed by i = 1...n. The cost of production is ci(qi) = cq
2
i /2 and abatement cost
is ai(qi, ei) = k(qi− ei/γi)2/2 as in section 3.2.1. Firms are heterogeneous according to
parameter γi. The number of firms of type γi is ni and
∑
i ni = n. Let us denote the
mean γ¯ and the variance σ2γ of parameter γ.
Using (7), we immediately obtain that:
qˆi =
p+ τ − fγi
c
eˆi = γi(qˆi −
fγi
k(1− s))
This in turn allows to compute aggregate values for production, emissions and abate-
ment expenditures as follows:
Qˆ =
n (p+ τ − fγ¯)
c
Eˆ = nγ¯
p+ τ
c
− nf(1
c
+
1
k(1− s))(σ
2
γ + γ¯
2)
Aˆ =
nf 2(σ2γ + γ¯
2)
2k(1− s)2 .
We look for τ , s and f such that the system (8),(9),(10) hold for the above values
of Qˆ, Eˆ and Aˆ. We show in Appendix D that there are two solutions (τ 1, s1, f1) and
(τ 2, s2, f2), say respectively solution 1 and 2. Following the remark above, we also
impose the additional constraint that a refunding policy should benefit the industry as
a whole to our search and it appears that this holds only for solution 1 as explained
below.
We depict the tax t and the two solutions 1 and 2 in Figure 2, as a function of
the initial tax t for a specific set of parameters.10 Figure 2 panel (a) indicates that
solution 1 entails a tax on abatement and tax refunding through output subsidy along
with emissions being overtaxed compared to the initial tax t. On the contrary, Figure
10We use p = 15, c = 1, k = 1/2, γ¯ = 0.7, σγ = 0.3, δ = 1 and n = 1. Tax t is allowed to vary
between 1 and 6. A tax t > 1 ensures a corresponding abatement subsidy s < 1. At t = 6, aggregate
pollution cancels out.
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2 panel (b) shows that solution 2 entails a tax on output and tax refunding through
abatement subsidy along with emissions being undertaxed.
By construction, both solutions lead to same aggregate production Q∗ and emis-
sions E∗ depicted on Figure 3 panel (a), but they differ in terms of aggregate abatement
expenditures and cost of production: While solution 1 entails lower abatement expen-
ditures but higher production cost (Cˆ1 ≥ C∗, Aˆ1 ≤ A∗), solution 2 entails higher
abatement expenditures but lower production costs (Cˆ2 ≤ C∗, Aˆ2 ≥ A∗) at the ag-
gregate level. This is because the solution 1 implies a reallocation of production (and
pollution) towards firms with low values of γ while it is the reverse for the solution 2.
As shown by Figure 3 panel (b), it turns out that only the three-part refunding policy
(τ 1, s1, f1) is beneficial for the industry, compared to the standard tax benchmark.
More precisely, for the solution 1, we prove in Appendix E that qˆi > q
∗
i iff γi < γ¯
and that eˆi > e
∗
i iff γi < γ¯ + σ
2
γ/γ¯. The refunding policy (τ 1, s1, f1) thus implies that
large firms (with low γ) are producing more and are polluting more at the expense of
smaller firms, compared to the standard tax benchmark. As aggregate production and
pollution remain unchanged, the redistribution operated by this uniform three-part
refunding policy is clearly in favor of the larger firms.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a three-part refunding policy can help to alleviate the
drawbacks of either pure output based refunding or pure abatement expenditure based
refunding. In particular, when the regulated industry is homogenous, it is possible to
replicate the standard emission tax outcome using such a policy: with the appropriate
definition of the fee and of the output and abatement subsidies, the three-part refunding
policy induces the polluting firm to choose the production and emission levels obtained
under any emission tax, without departing from budget balance. By construction, the
proposed regulation scheme entails that the polluter earns strictly more than under the
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(a): Tax on abatement (s < 0), emissions are overtaxed (f1 > t)
and refunding through output subsidy (τ 1 > 0).
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(b): Tax on output (τ 2 < 0), emissions are undertaxed (f2 < t)
and refunding through abatement subsidy (s > 0).
Figure 2: Solutions 1 and 2 for a uniform three-part refunding policy.
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(a): Production (Q∗), emissions (E∗), costs (C∗, Cˆ1 and Cˆ2)
and abatement expenditures (A∗, Aˆ1 and Aˆ2).
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(b): Industry’s profit (Π∗, Πˆ1 and Πˆ2).
Figure 3: Production, emissions, costs and profits under uniform three-part refunding
policies.
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standard tax alone without rebate, thereby making this proposal highly acceptable.
When the industry is heterogenous, the refunding policy needed to replicate the
standard emission tax outcome is now personalized in the sense that at least the output
subsidy should be type dependent. Another result is that this three-part policy is
strictly preferred from the industry’s point of view to a standard environmental tax.
By specifying the model, we also show that a uniform three-part refunding policies can
also replicate standard tax outcome in the aggregate at the sector’s level with respect
to production and emissions without departing from the budget constraint.
Overall, in this paper, we have shown that there are ways to design refunded pol-
lution taxes so that negative impacts on the industry’s profit are attenuated while still
inducing firms to limit emissions. Obviously, a refunding policy lessens the industry’s
reluctance to the pollution tax, but this comes at the drawback of making entry easier
in the market which may impair pollution reduction in the long run (see Cato, 2010,
for a possible remedy based on an entry license). Also, such policies however require
information on emissions, outputs and abatement expenditures. It would thus be inter-
esting to investigate the design of such refunding policies when these informations are
private and/or can be observed at a cost by the regulator (see e.g. Bontems and Bour-
geon, 2005, and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo,2006, for analysis of pollution taxes
under costly observability of pollution). Finally, another interesting extension would
be to analyze the design of three part refunding policies for imperfectly competitive
market structures. We leave this to future research.
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Appendix
A Comparative statics
Dropping the firm’s index for the sake of clarity and introducing a positive scale pa-
rameter θ for abatement cost function, the system (1) rewrites as:
p = c′(q∗) + θaq(q∗, e∗)
−θae(q∗, e∗) = t.
Differentiating totally this system and dropping arguments, we obtain:
dq =
1
∆
[aqedt+ aeedp− (aqaee − aeaqe)dθ]
de =
1
∆
[(aec
′′ − θ(aeaqq − aqaqe))dθ − (c′′ + θaqq) dt− θaqedp]
where ∆ = aeec
′′ + θ(aeeaqq − a2qe) > 0 under quasi-convexity of total cost c(.) + a(., .).
We obtain that:
∂q
∂p
=
1
∆
aee > 0 and
∂e
∂t
= −c
′′ + θaqq
∆
< 0.
Also, under assumption 1, we obtain that:
∂q
∂t
=
1
∆
aqe < 0 and
∂e
∂p
= −aqe
∆
> 0.
Finally, assumption 2 allows to state that:
∂q
∂θ
= −(aqaee − aeaqe)
∆
< 0 and
∂e
∂θ
= −(aeaqq − aqaqe))
∆
> 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
To get qˆ(τ , s, f) = q∗ and eˆ(τ , s, f) = e∗, in view of the FOCs (2) and (5), it is sufficient
to take
f = t+ sa∗e = (1− s)t
τ = −sa∗q.
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Also, the subsidy s is given by the budget constraint (3) that now writes:
nfe∗ = nτq∗ + nsa∗ +R (11)
or equivalently with R = (1− δ)tne∗
(t+ sa∗e) e
∗ = −sa∗qq∗ + sa∗ + (1− δ)te∗
s =
δte∗
a∗ − a∗ee∗ − a∗qq∗
=
δte∗
σ∗a∗
where σ∗ = 1− ε∗a,e − ε∗a,q with ε∗a,e = a∗ee∗/a∗ < 0 and ε∗a,q = a∗qq∗/a∗ > 0 and recalling
that t = −a∗e from (1). Observe that σ∗ = 0 needs to be ruled out otherwise the budget
equality constraint cannot hold.
Also, to preserve quasi concavity of the polluter’s program, we need s < 1 which
amounts to assume that
σ∗ >
δte∗
a∗
whenever is is positive.
Finally, by construction, the difference in terms of net profit is
pˆi(τ , s, f)− pi∗ = (p+ τ)q∗ − c(q∗)− (1− s)a∗ − fe∗ − pq∗ + c(q∗) + a∗ + te∗
= τq∗ + sa∗ + (t− f)e∗
= fe∗ − (1− δ)te∗ + (t− f)e∗ = δte∗
by using the budget constraint.
C Proof of Proposition 5
To get qˆi = q
∗ and eˆi = e∗, in view of the FOCs (1) and (7), it is sufficient to take
fi = (1− si)t
τ i = −sia∗iq. (12)
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Moreover, the budget constraint writes:
∑
i
fie
∗
i =
∑
i
τ iq
∗
i +
∑
i
sia
∗
i + (1− δ)tE∗ (13)
Using (12) and replacing in (13), we get
∑
i
(1− si)te∗i = −
∑
i
sia
∗
iqq
∗
i +
∑
i
sia
∗
i + (1− δ)tE∗
which implies ∑
i
σ∗i a
∗
i si = δtE
∗ (14)
with σ∗i = 1− ε∗ai,e − ε∗ai,q.
Moreover, the difference between net profits is:
pˆii − pi∗i = (p+ τ i) q∗i − ci(q∗i )− (1− si)ai(q∗i , e∗i )− fie∗i − (pq∗i − ci(q∗i )− ai(q∗i , e∗i )− te∗i )
= τ iq
∗
i + sia
∗
i + (t− fi)e∗i
Replacing with the values obtained for the instruments τ i and fi and recalling that
t = −a∗ie, we obtain:
pˆii − pi∗i = si
(
a∗i − a∗iqq∗i − a∗iee∗i
)
= sia
∗
iσ
∗
i
Summing over i and using (14), we thus get Πˆ− Π∗ = ∑i σ∗i a∗i si = δtE∗ > 0.
D Example
From the expression for individual production,
qˆi =
p+ τ − fγi
c
we get by summing over i :
Qˆ =
n (p+ τ − fγ¯)
c
Also from
eˆi = γi(qˆi −
fγi
k(1− s))
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we obtain similarly
Eˆ =
∑
i
niγi(qˆi −
fγi
k(1− s))
=
∑
i
niγi(
p+ τ − fγi
c
− fγi
k(1− s))
Eˆ = nγ¯
p+ τ
c
− nf(1
c
+
1
k(1− s))(σ
2
γ + γ¯
2)
Finally, for abatement expenditures we obtain:
Aˆ =
∑
i
ni
k(qˆi − eˆi/γi)2
2
=
f 2
2k(1− s)2
∑
i
niγ
2
i =
nf 2(σ2γ + γ¯
2)
2k(1− s)2 (15)
The system to be solved in (τ , s, f) rewrites as follows:
Qˆ = Q∗ (16)
Eˆ = E∗ (17)
fEˆ = τQˆ+ sAˆ+ (1− δ)tE∗ (18)
Equation (16) can be expressed as
n (p+ τ − fγ¯)
c
=
n (p− tγ¯)
c
from which we deduce that
τ = (f − t)γ¯ (19)
Also, equation (17) writes as
nγ¯
p+ τ
c
− nf(1
c
+
1
k(1− s))(σ
2
γ + γ¯
2) = nγ¯
p
c
− nt(1
c
+
1
k
)(σ2γ + γ¯
2)
and replacing τ using (19) allows to obtain
γ¯2
(f − t)
c
− f(1
c
+
1
k(1− s))(σ
2
γ + γ¯
2) = −t(1
c
+
1
k
)(σ2γ + γ¯
2)
which simplifies into
f
1− s = t+ λ(t− f) (20)
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where λ ≡ k
c
σ2γ
σ2γ+γ¯
2 ≥ 0. We can deduce f as a function of s :
f = t
(1 + λ)(1− s)
1 + λ(1− s)
When there is homogeneity, σ2γ = 0 and thus λ = 0 and we recover f = (1− s)t as in
Proposition 2.
Last, using (16) and (17), the budget constraint (18) rewrites simply as
[f − t(1− δ)]E∗ = τQ∗ + sAˆ
[f − t(1− δ)]E∗ = (f − t)γ¯Q∗ + sAˆ
or using (15) and the definition of E∗ and Q∗:
[f − t(1− δ)]E∗ = (f − t)γ¯Q∗ + snf
2(σ2γ + γ¯
2)
2k(1− s)2
This allows to compute s/(1− s) as a function of f :
s
1− s =
2k
σ2γ + γ¯
2
f(E∗ − γ¯Q∗) + t(γ¯Q∗ − (1− δ)E∗)
t+ λ(t− f)
Hence, it follows that:
1
1− s = 1 +
2k
σ2γ + γ¯
2
f(E∗ − γ¯Q∗) + t(γ¯Q∗ − (1− δ)E∗)
t+ λ(t− f)
and replacing in (20):
f
(
1 +
2k
σ2γ + γ¯
2
f(E∗ − γ¯Q∗) + t(γ¯Q∗ − (1− δ)E∗)
t+ λ(t− f)
)
= t+ λ(t− f)
which amounts to solve a polynomial equation of degree 2 in f . We denote the two
solutions f1 and f2. And the corresponding values of τ and s by respectively τ 1, τ 2, s1
and s2.
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E Reallocation of production and pollution between
firms
We compare qˆi and eˆi taken at the solution 1 (f1, τ 1, s1) with their counterparts q
∗
i and
e∗i in the standard tax benchmark. Let us start with quantities:
qˆi − q∗i =
p+ τ 1 − f1γi
c
− p− tγi
c
=
τ 1 + (t− f1)γi
c
(21)
From (19), we know that τ 1 = (f1 − t)γ¯ and replacing in (21), we get:
qˆi − q∗i =
(f1 − t)(γ¯ − γi)
c
As solution 1 entails over-taxation of emissions (f1 > t), we obtain that qˆi > q
∗
i ⇔
γi < γ¯.
Now we compare the emission levels:
eˆi − e∗i = γi(qˆi −
f1γi
k(1− s1))− γi(q
∗
i −
tγi
k
)
= γi
(
(f1 − t)(γ¯ − γi)
c
+
γi
k
(
t− f1
1− s1
))
(22)
Using (20) and replacing in (22), we obtain:
eˆi − e∗i = γi
(
(f1 − t)(γ¯ − γi)
c
− γi
k
λ(t− f1)
)
= γi(f1 − t)
(
γ¯ − γi
c
+
γi
k
λ
)
Recall that λ ≡ k
c
σ2γ
σ2γ+γ¯
2 so that by rearranging,
eˆi − e∗i =
γi(f1 − t)γ¯2
c(σ2γ + γ¯
2)
(
σ2γ
γ¯
+ γ¯ − γi
)
Once again, using that f1 > t, it follows that eˆi > e
∗
i ⇔ γi < γ¯ + σ
2
γ
γ¯
.
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